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Abstract: The paper discusses the relationship between Commons, Social Capital, and sustainability
in terms of resources used, tools available, and goals to be achieved. The conceptual framework
differs from the traditional one, which considers Commons and Social Capital as different resources.
The paper considers Commons and Social Capital as homogeneous assets defined by the rights related
to the access, use, and reproduction of collective resources, material or immaterial, which are essential
to reduce the difference between private and social costs in the economic processes. This approach
derives from a definition of sustainability as a private and social responsibility in reproducing all
the resources used in the life processes, minimizing the waste caused by their exhaustion and loss
of fertility. The paper refers to the model of Commons by the school of Elinor Ostrom to explain
the nature and role of Social Capital and to observe it in different units of analysis, with particular
attention to the forms of cooperative enterprise. The last part of the work outlines field research on
the Parmigiano Reggiano supply chain as a natural laboratory to test the theoretical hypotheses.
Keywords: sustainability; commons; social capital; cooperative; agri-food supply chain; parmesan
cheese district
1. Introduction
The paper seeks to highlight theoretical and empirical evidence that demonstrates the
link between Social Capital (SC) production and resource regeneration, which is considered
the main aspect of sustainability. The case of the Parmigiano Reggiano supply chain
analyzed in the paper is an important natural laboratory for testing this hypothesis.
The definitions of sustainability present in the literature are numerous, often ambigu-
ous, and sometimes contradictory [1,2]. To analyze the relationship between sustainability
and social capital, it is useful to collect the different approaches into three large groups, of
which only one seems logically sustainable and compatible with the concept of SC.
The first one is based on the search for an optimal balance of the needs and consump-
tion of the current generation versus those of future generations. The second approach
focuses on the efficiency of the circular process production–consumption–(re)production.
The last one concerns the degree of conservation of the fertility of the resources in the
process of use–reproduction of the resources themselves. If natural resources, materials,
and human capabilities were always abundant, the three approaches would not lead to
different conclusions from the classical ones of economic efficiency.
In the face of the growing scarcity of raw materials and environmental degradation
and the increase in inequalities, the first approach to sustainability shows all its logical
inconsistency: today, the future generations cannot express an effective demand for the
resources necessary to cover their future needs; therefore, there is no mechanism that
can determine the real value of scarcity. Will the legacy of SC—such as shared norms,
values, trusts, attitudes, and beliefs, which are valid for a generation—still be able to
help the new generations to face the different challenges, or will they represent a serious
obstacle to facing the new challenges in an innovative way? According to Diamond [3]
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and Acemoglou et al. [4], conservative institutions—locked in identity rules, foreseeing the
future as a projection of the past—are among the main causes of the crisis and extinction of
ancient civilizations.
The second approach, which considers the efficiency of the circular economy, appears
much more robust, with explicit attention to minimizing waste and environmental damage.
In this vision, an engineering perspective of optimization prevails, with the search for
best practices supposing positive effects of innovation [5]. However, the effectiveness of
this approach is linked to the different interests of the agents and to the definition of the
“limits” of the responsibilities of the decision-makers. Therefore, if the targets are visible,
the expected behaviors of the different actors are less clear: who should take care of the
sustainability of all systems going beyond the boundaries of the individual interests, why,
and how? How will shared norms, values, trusts, attitudes, and beliefs help overcome the
“NIMBY syndrome” of opulent societies that want to offload the cost of their waste onto
others? This approach lacks indications of the social actions to bridge the gap between
private and collective interests.
The last definition of sustainability adopted in the paper is focused on the idea that
the reproduction of the resources’ fertility must be a responsibility and a commitment
of those who use them, directly or indirectly. In other words, we consider a sustainable
system capable of reproducing and regenerating all the resources used in the economic
processes—with the respect to the natural time needed for their regeneration—in order
to maintain or increase the capacities/fertility of the resources themselves, supporting
(minimizing) the social costs deriving from their use (capacity loss, waste, social and
environmental decay) [6].
According to our definition, the classical concept of Paretian efficiency of maximizing
the private profit to pursue efficiency is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition to guar-
antee the sustainability of a socio-economic process. From a theoretical point of view, the
resources cannot be considered “given”, both because many of them are exhaustible, and
because all of them must be continuously regenerated to maintain their economic fertility.
Some regeneration processes are carried out during the usual activity (e.g., the amortization
of physical capital), while other ones may be incompletely or not regenerated, especially
when they are considered “external” to the process of production. In this context, the
classic economic objective—of minimizing costs and maximizing revenues—may represent
a rational behavior for some agents, but it is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition to
guarantee a solution to the social dilemma of reducing the progressive divergence between
private and social costs [6]. In terms of the new institutional economy, the divergence
between private and social costs will not necessarily be resolved by market or hierarchical
coordination. On the contrary, it is very likely that without a social action, the search for a
sustainable solution will not even be addressed [7]. The construction and use of SC must
be considered an important attempt to resolve/mitigate the recalled divergence. Therefore,
the paper seeks to highlight some logical links and empirical evidence able to testify the
link between the SC production and the resource regeneration. The case of the Parmigiano
Reggiano supply chain is an important natural laboratory for testing this hypothesis
Based on the research question, the paper is structured in five parts: after this in-
troduction (Section 1), Section 2 presents the theoretical background, Section 3 specifies
methods and empirical materials, and Section 4 discusses the results of the empirical re-
search. Finally, Section 5 proposes some concluding remarks. More specifically, in Section 2,
Section 2.1 addresses the issue of a new definition of the SC as a set of rights; Section 2.2
discusses how the proposed definition is congruent with the concept of “Commons” ac-
cording to the model of Elinor Ostrom (MO); in Section 2.3, the analysis moves from a
meso-economic to a micro-economic plan, discussing how the companies belonging to the
cooperative movement play a relevant role in the construction of SC; Section 2.4 focuses on
a critical discussion of the presumed negative effects of SC—the so-called “dark side” of
the SC—which the literature considers a not negligible aspect, especially when the unit
of analysis is the business organization [8]. Section 3 (Sections 3.1 and 3.2) describes the
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reasons of interest of the case study on the Parmigiano Reggiano (PR) cheese supply chain,
and Section 4 (Section 4.1, Section 4.2, Section 4.3) presents the results of in-depth research,
where the role of the SC, deriving by cooperation, is relevant to increase the sustainability
and resilience of the production chain and of the entire eco-social local system, even in the
economic fragile areas.
2. Theoretical Background
2.1. Social Capital as a Set of Rights
The huge literature on SC seems to agree in dividing the contributions into two main
strands, structuralist and culturalist (cognitive) vision [7,9,10]. The first strand considers SC
as a “hardware”, a “resource” built on consolidated roles, social networks, and other social
structures. The second one focuses its attention on the collective cognitive “resources”,
such as shared norms, values, trust, attitudes, and beliefs: SC is like a software. Both
strands refer to SC as a resource—existing or used—but none of them defines what is the
“nature” of SC, avoiding a tautological definition: using again ICT language, they miss the
explanation of SC as “operating system”. As a proof of this lack, there is the misleading
use of the indicators to measure SC: no matter what classification they belong to, most of
them may be used in a contradictory way to support the existence of SC or, in the opposite
direction, as a counterfactual, showing the dark side of SC.
The definition of SC, and therefore of its measure, is a well-known issue. The common
core of the various criticisms is the association of the two terms “capital” and “social”,
which are considered antithetical, generating an oxymoron more dangerous than useful for
deepening the theory or rigorously using in the empirical research [11,12]. Therefore, the
standard theory considers the use of the term “social capital” improper and misleading.
Moreover—and even more important—the conceptual ambiguity of the concept and defi-
nition of SC stands as a serious obstacle to the multidisciplinary dialogue [9] (p. 7). At the
empirical level, some contradictions are evident, as shown in the following examples:
1. For any indicator of SC, it is possible to find positive or counterfactual negative effects
(e.g., social cohesion vs. mafia; belief vs. superstition; etc.);
2. The role of the relationships among agents, spontaneous or induced by the context,
is ambiguous because of the circularity between the production and consumption
of SC that makes never clear whether these elements are the solution or part of the
problem. For example, it is not clear how to measure SC when the unit of analysis
is modified, shifting from the enterprise to the territory [13]. Is SC engendered by
the action of the companies or, on the contrary, does the presence of SC determine a
specific business/institutions behavior?
3. More specifically, the literature shows that when dealing with a specific issue such as
local development—as in the case of this paper—the role of cooperative enterprises
and of cooperation is a basic problem in the definition of SC.
In the paper, we propose the following definition: SC is the set of all the economic material
or intangible assets, resulting from the collective decisions for producing public goods, toll goods,
and common goods. Therefore, it is a set of goods for which the right of access and enjoyment is not
governed exclusively by individual choices of use, exclusion, and transfer. These rights define the
resource SC as the result of collective choices of access, use, and reproduction of non-private economic
assets—no matter if tangible or intangible—by the application of rules, which are distinctive of the
specific economic process. The measure of the productivity of SC is its contribution to increasing the
sustainability of the ecological–social system that uses it.
The indication by R. Coase is the first and most effective exemplification of the core of
the theoretical problem: the inadequacy of the term SC being understood as the “quantity”
of a resource; in general, this a problem no different from the ambiguity of measuring any
form of capital as a given factor.
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“A . . . reason for the failure to develop a theory adequate to handle the problem [
. . . ] stems from a faulty concept of a factor of production. This is usually thought
of as a physical entity which the businessman acquires and uses (an acre of land, a
ton of fertilizer) instead of as a right to perform certain (physical) actions. We may
speak of a person owning land and using it as a factor of production but what the
landowner in fact possesses is the right to carry out a circumscribed list of actions.
[ . . . ]. This does not come about simply because of Government regulation. It
would be equally true under the common law. In fact, it would be true under any
system of law. A system in which the rights of individuals were unlimited would
be one in which there were no rights to acquire.” [14] (p. 43–44).
The change of perspective on the nature of SC—from a given resource to a set of rights
and duties on non-private assets that generate the resource itself—is not at all obvious, but it
may be fundamental in the discussion on SC and its role in the resilience of a business or a
specific area. In this regard, according to the empirical part of the paper, there are examples
of investments in SC deriving by a collective decision to implement the quality system
of the production chain, to change the rules for selling the product, and to implement
a digital platform to manage e-commerce [15–17]. All the recalled examples are specific
cases of construction of SC by means of SC, where the investment in SC is activated re-
shaping (acquisition, transfer, abolition, redefinition) all the existing rights—private and
non-private, legal, or customary—that allow economic and social processes to be carried
out over time.
The transition from a vision of the SC as a “resource” to a different idea of SC as a set
of rights and duties allows overcoming the criticisms addressed to the logical coherence
and economic consistency of the concept of SC, including the misleading debate on the
“dark side”, which we will address later.
2.2. The Sustainability of the “Commons” in the Elinor Ostrom’s Model
The discussion on the so-called “Tragedy of the Commons” has a path that runs in
parallel to the debate about the nature and the measure of SC. From the famous work
of Garret Hardin [18] to the innovative contribution of Ostrom [19–22] and her research
team [23,24], the debate on this issue was mainly focused on the idea that water, marine
biomass, forests, wild animals, etc., existing in nature, had to be considered a stock of
economic “resources”, no differently from iron, territory or fossil deposits from which
humanity has drawn throughout its history. In the traditional economic theory, all these
resources are resumed in the category “Land”, whose use/value is regulated by the exercise
of the private rights and, therefore, by the market. In this vision, if a specific factor is
“abundant”, its economic value will be zero and, if it is scarce, it will be determined by the
market thanks to the action of supply and demand.
According to the standard economic culture, the “Commons” are engendered by a
lack of a clear and properly established rights of private property: therefore, they are not
excludable but rivals in consumption. As it is generally known, a significant economic
problem arises when a free access to the “resource” causes a divergence between private
and social costs: each agent will have an opportunistic convenience in using most of the
resource to prevent another “opportunistic” agent from doing the same still to a greater
extent. In a world where the homo economicus is dominant among the species, common
resources are expected to be exhausted through an exploitation that does not respect the
limited nature of the deposits and/or the natural times of the reproduction in the case of
the living species.
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Given the Commons, to avoid the “tragedy” of their destruction by a super exploita-
tion, there have been two opposite policy proposals to make the use of these factors
sustainable: the need for state intervention to protect resources with rules and constraints
for their use versus the need to better define the private rights of exploitation allowing a full
internalization of costs and a more rational self-regulation in the private use: that is, the
Illuminist State vs. Perfect Market [19] (p. 9).
Ostrom’s work, starting from the contributions of the 1960s, is a theoretical and em-
pirical navigation between the ideology of the Omnipotent State and the indisputable
superiority of Private Efficiency. In her forty years of contributions—with the acknowl-
edgement of the Nobel Prize—her relevant field research aimed to elaborate all the possible
solutions to the main “social dilemma” of sustainability: to find the balance between
short-term private interest and long-term social advantages. In particular, she focused
on the selection of the circumstances making possible a collective, cooperative, and sus-
tainable management of common resources, which are reproduced and available to the
community in the long term. In this perspective, the process of definition and reproduction
over time of such circumstances is the nature of the “common good” and corresponds
to the asset of Social Capital embedded in the ecological–social system studied. In her
empirical approach, no less important is the search for counterfactuals: first, the study of
the reasons for the possible failures and, therefore, the dissolution of the SC produced and
used previously. Moreover, the research was supported by the verification in the behavioral
economics laboratories and by the meta-analysis of the collected material [24]. For instance,
anticipating the empirical example that follows, the disciplinary of Parmigiano Reggiano is
a Commons—and an SC asset—of the system and constitutes a prerequisite, a tool, and an
outcome of the functioning of the process. Its economic role as SC is no less important in
the supply chain than a private capital asset (e.g., a cow or a milk tank).
In the model of Ostrom (MO) and her collaborators [23] (Figure 1), Commons/SC
production depends on the simultaneous realization of eight conditions A.1–A.8, which
regulate the access and reproduction of the common resources. In more detail, the func-
tioning and resilience of an ecological–social system depends on the success in maintain-
ing/changing the equilibrium conditions of two groups of forces: the different criticalities
produced by the relationships between internal stakeholders (arrows 1–6) must be con-
trasted with the respect of conditions A.1–A.6; the best possible internalization of shocks
that originate outside the system (arrows 7 and 8) is easier if conditions A.7 and A.8 occur.
Operationally, an ecological–social system is a process that is carried out by continuously
counteracting the internal (B.3 and B.4) and external threats (B.1, B.2, B.5).
The framework in the figure never describes “events” but socio-economic processes
that are historically determined [20]. In other words, the units investigated (Commons
or SC, no matter if a territory, a natural resource, a company, a quality system, etc.) must
be defined by an interval of time and by an “institutional” boundary separating what
is relevant within the observed process from what belongs to the context in which the
process itself takes place [25]. It is important to note the convergency of results with other
analyses [4] also from disciplines other than economics and sociology [1].
The model just described will be used in the description of the case analyzed in
Section 3.
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and  later  the  social enterprises—has  faced over  time  some  critical problems  similar  to 
those of SC and  the Commons, mentioned above, even  if  the debate on cooperation  is 
independent and older. The cooperatives and the cooperative movement are an important 
Figure 1. Commons and Social Capital: the structure of the model; (A) the necessary conditions for sustainability; (B)
threats to resilience. Source: [20,23].
2.3. Social Capital and Cooperative etworks
The literature on the nature, role, li its, and destinies of the cooperative enterprise—
and later the social enter rises s faced over time some critical problems similar to
those of SC and the Co , ti ned above, even if the debate on cooperation is
independent and older. and the c operative movement are an important
laboratory for a counterfactual analysis of the organizational models of possible forms of
enterprise.
With origins tracing back to the foundation of a small shop in Rochdale (UK) in
1844, the modern cooperative firm constitutes an organizational reaction to the vast social
costs engendered by the first industrial revolution [7,26,27]. The cooperative organization
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transitioned from a utopian form of enterprise into a modern organizational structure
with the adhesion to and respect for seven rules (Table 1). This mutual form of enterprise,
which jointly produces goods, services, and SCs, shows that the boundaries of the firm
do not coincide with only property rights of the private capital. In line with our defining
of sustainability, it can be said that the principles of cooperation are the first example of
CSR in which—in a bottom–up and non-paternalistic way—the interests of individuals
and those of the community are jointly considered.
Table 1. Congruence between the principles of cooperation and economic sustainability of the
cooperative enterprise.
Cooperatives Principles [28] Economic Effects
1. Voluntary and Open Membership
• Freedom of entry and exit;
• Contestability of the extra profits;
• Responsibility (self-control vs.
opportunistic behavior).
2. Democratic Member Control
• Symmetric information;
• Sharing of responsibility (democratic
control vs. auto-referential control);
• Not contestability of shares and equal right
of participation (common goods and social
capital not privatizing).
3. Member Economic Participation
• Auto limitation of the profit distribution;
• Endogenous sources of financing;
• Contestability of extra profits;
• Responsibility (self-control vs.
opportunistic behavior).
4. Autonomy and Independence
• Corporate social responsibility;
• Autonomous economic choices;
• Economic criteria in the resource allocation.
5. Education, Training, and
Information
• Symmetric information;
• Internalization of the costs in human capital
investments:
# Human resource reproduction;
# Competences development;
• Relational goods implementation;
• Intergenerational transmission of skills,
values, and resources;
6. Cooperation among Cooperatives
• Formation of relationship networks.
• Lower transaction costs;
• Redistribution of the extra profits with
supply-chain partners and consumers;
• Responsibility using the market power
(example: Fair Trade).
7. Concern for Community
• Respect of the rules;
• Internalization of the social costs;
• Pooling of the individual and social risks;
• Reconciling corporate sustainability and
induced social costs.
Source: Own presentation.
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The cooperative movement demonstrates that the nature of the enterprise includes
all the internal and external resources defined and used by the company itself, within the
limits of the exercise of the rights of the different stakeholders. The full exploitation of
these resources (for example, the work or the product of the members or other physical
or intangible assets in common) faces the economic problem of modifying the reasons
of exchange (e.g., deriving by monopoly, low wages, or low product quality), that have
determined the misuse or degradation of the capability of the factors.
According to the hypothesis of perfect competition, the cooperative enterprises are
theoretically inconsistent because the factors are always given—in quantity and quality—
and remunerated in function to their contribution to the production; moreover, they are
empirically dangerous because of their attempt to alter the “natural” prices, arising the risk
of a permanent market failure, encouraging monopoly rents, opportunistic behavior, and
negative externalities. In other words, violating the rules of competition, they risk giving
way to the forces pushing toward the “dark side” of the economy.
As known, the main objective of the cooperative enterprise is to integrate and share the
use of goods owned by its members (work, machinery, skills, etc.), avoiding the systematic
risk of partial use, normally arising if there are conditions of low economic fertility (small
dimension of enterprises, fragile areas, or difficult condition of processing). Thanks to the
cooperation, super-additive conditions can be generated even when individual resources
are fragile or dispersed, achieving economies of scope or scale on which the sustainability
of the enterprise is based. In the case study of the paper, these forces operate continuously,
supporting the entire agri-food system. Therefore, the first innovation of the modern
cooperative enterprise is to have understood that the respect of the mutualistic exchange
rules is a factor producing value; so, it must be remunerated as the other production factors.
As pointed out by a vast literature [29,30], this factor can be considered an asset of the
overall SC, and its “remuneration” is the Patronage Refund.
The economic convenience of cooperation is only one of the basic conditions to realize
a cooperative. Indeed, the SC deriving by mutuality must be continuously reproduced,
enlarged, and passed on to the future generations of members. Therefore, the SC is
the product of an eco-social process made possible by the implementation of the seven
necessary conditions of cooperation, which define the corporate pact (definition of rights).
Table 1 outlines how the seven principles have a precise content of both private economic
rationality and sustainability, incorporating into the business costs the maximum of the
induced “social” costs. This allows building a congruence between the micro conditions of
cooperation and the macro conditions of sustainability of the system, as shown in Table 2.
In particular, if the microsystem of the cooperative enterprises remains open, respecting
principles 6 and 7, there is a systematic reproduction of SC. We will see later an important
example of such synergistic effects in the case study presented.
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Table 2. Congruence between the rules of the cooperative pact and the conditions necessary for the functioning of
socio-ecological systems.
Cooperatives Principles Commons Principles
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Consequently,  the mafia system  is an establishment of monopoly power acting on  the 
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and  use  of  violence,  preserving  a  given  hierarchy  of  power.  If  apparently  positive 
indicators  of  SC  are  observed  (dark  side),  the  full  conditions  of  SC  sustainability  are 




2.4. The Forces of the “Dark Side” and Social Capital Measure
As has been said, the measure of the productivity of the SC is its contribution to
increasing the su tainability of the ecological–social system that uses it. Claiming that
cological–social system “uses” the SC means th t the SC—as well as gra n r any
capital factor—is an input factor (grain-seed), a process fund ( rain-sown) and, finally, an
output of the process (grain-harvest) [25]. However, on the empirical level, the cause–effect
relationship between availability and use may change, depending on the unit of analysis.
For example, as for the capital factor, it is not possible to measure the SC supplied by a
single company or by the whole system in an unambiguous way.
To measure SC, the focus needs to shift from the visible effects (e.g., the existence of
social networks) to the effectiveness in the application of the rules defining the commons
produced (Table 2), which affect sustainability. Compliance with the previously defined
sustai ability criteria gua ntees the good use and fertility of resources, and this aspect can
be measured through appropriate indicators i relation t the ty e of an lysis unit: meso-
economic (e.g., environmental degradation or long-term unemployment rate duration, etc.)
or microeconomic (working conditions, waste production, product quality, degree of
SCR, etc.). Therefore, the survey shifts from traditional and unclear SC indicators to new
sustainability indicators, for instance, according to Table 2.
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If the SC and sustainability are factors of the economic process, we may suppose
that the misreproduction of the fertility conditions of SC and decay move in the same
direction. The decay of the fertility is in both cases the result of the destruction engendered
by the disappearance/lack of respect of one or more of the necessary conditions, at the
micro or macro level, supporting the reproduction of the non-private goods. Therefore, the
indicators for measuring the degradation of sustainability—e.g., using in a correct way
indicators for the Sustainable Development Goals (17 SDGs and 169 Target) of the UN
Agenda 2030 [31,32]—these may be applied also to measure the SC, limiting the risk of
ambiguity discussed in the debate on the dark side. For example, in the case of the mafia
system, many indicators currently used to measure SC are observed with a positive value,
such as cohesion of relational networks, trust, cooperation, and solidarity. However, the
indicators are induced by conspiracy of silence and limited to the members of the group.
Consequently, the mafia system is an establishment of monopoly power acting on the
control of factors of demand and supply, such as the control of the labor market or of goods
and services. The mafia monopoly has a power guaranteed by its closed system and use of
violence, preserving a given hierarchy of power. If apparently positive indicators of SC
are observed (dark side), the full conditions of SC sustainability are missing, such as the
definition of the rights of access and of the participation in the management. As seen in
Tables 1 and 2, the rules just recalled are important to guarantee open communities and
to avoid the risk of preserving monopoly power or position rents. Adherence to all the
conditions listed in the tables is the necessary condition to observe SC avoiding the risk of
“dark side”.
An open system implies that it is not possible to assume ex ante a condition of auto-
matic and stable equilibrium, and it is necessary to balance the internal contrasting needs
and interests that constitute the nature of all social dilemmas of protection of individual
versus social interests (Ostrom 2007) [18–21]. From the external side, it is necessary to
react to the exogenous shocks (effects of the economic crisis or of the extreme events),
maintaining the whole system and the balance of private and collective internal interests,
using the existing SC.
If the unit of analysis is the cooperation, the balance between the self-production of
SC and the economic sustainability of the enterprise is determined by the respect of all
the circumstances reported in Table 2. The same conditions apply to the full cooperative
production system and movement. In the case of a specific production, all the chain is
interested in the same rules as in the case study presented in the following pages. This
respect roots the production of SC and of the sustainability of the system. Positive benefits
may also affect the area where the production is located, as in the case study presented.
The recalled conditions are the basis of the fertility of the resources of the system, enabling
its reproducibility, respecting the criteria of our definition of sustainability.
3. Material and Methods: The Case Study of Parmigiano Reggiano (PR) Supply Chain
The paper analyzes as an in-depth case study the PR cheese supply chain, which
is a production that has a great relevance in the Italian agri-food sector and where the
cooperation has a very relevant role. The investigation uses information collected by focus
groups and interviews with producers and representatives of private and cooperative
enterprises which allowed testing the main theoretical hypothesis on the Commons and on
the SC theories. The general description of the chain is made using statistical data of the
district, which are collected and elaborated by the sites of the Consortia (PR Consortium
and CPQR Consortium). The test of the theoretical hypothesis about SC and the role of
cooperation is made through the analysis and elaboration of data combining the three main
archives on budgets, technology, and physical production.
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3.1. The PR Supply Chain as an Eco-Social System
The history of the Italian cooperation movement is an important part of the history of
the entire agri-food sector, especially in the most developed regions of North Italy. The case
study of the paper is in Emilia-Romagna, which is a northern region offering one of the best
examples of the economic strength of the cooperative movement in Italy. Given the strong
presence of the cooperative movement since its origin, in the classic work of Putman [33],
this area was the main laboratory for the empirical analysis, definitions, and proposals of
the first indicators to measure SC. Currently, cooperative enterprises handle a great part
of the agri-food activities, which represent the second productive sector in the Italian and
regional economy. The cooperative movement has a crucial importance in the traditional
products of the “made in Italy” trademark, which is well known at the international level.
They are protected by European Union (EU) specific marks (DOP), which guarantee the
link of the product with a specific and limited territorial area and its tradition. The mark
defines specific rules of production, limiting the boundaries of the economic evolution
of the production system in terms of its possible geographical expansion, raw materials
processed, and way of producing. Innovation needs to take into consideration all the limits
imposed by the DOP. The object of the case study refers to one of the most important
products among these ones, the PR.
The description of the production process of PR is apparently very simple and orga-
nized in the main stages of milk production, processing, seasoning, and marketing, and it
is not dissimilar to what happens in all dairy business. However, the compliance with the
quality rules required by the DOP constitutes the identity of PR. The aim of the case study
discussion is to show that the SC deriving by the complex action of cooperation inside the
PR chain makes the production sustainable and maintains the balance among numerous
economic agents, mainly SMEs, acting also as a fundamental element of economic support
for the entire ecological–social system of a large territory. In this regard, the paper outlines
the role of cooperation in all the production phases and especially in the control, reproduc-
tion, and reinforcement of the social pacts linked to the respect of the mark and defined
by the social production rules. The acceptance/sharing of these rules, their control, and
sanctions, is one of the main aspects of SC in the supply chain, representing an economic
asset and a common good available to all agents and consumers.
Moving from Ostrom’s results summarized in Figure 1, it is possible to see how the
action of cooperation inside a PR chain allows reproducing and enlarging SC, straightening
all the production chain and also including the private no-cooperative economic actors.
Figure 2 adapts the MO scheme of Figure 1 to the PR supply chain with the aim of showing
how the interaction of different elements of MO builds or straightens SC as a system of
non-private goods benefiting all the chain agents. An example of such goods, among many
others, is the agreement among PR producers and institutions such as the Ministry of
Agriculture, Region, and Antitrust for the definition of individual quota of production for
milk, in coherence with the respect of the market rules and the open system of cooperation
for the full chain [16]. Given that the chain is spread all over the district of production, it
plays a crucial role in maintaining the population of the territory, especially in the fragile
areas of the hills and mountains, in reinforcing SMEs, and in balancing the development of
the area. In other words, it regenerates the resources used in the process of production and
their fertility, being a good example of a sustainable socio-economic system according to
our definition.
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Figure 2. PR as social–ecological system and social capital in the supply chain. Source: Own presentation.
3.2. The Role of Cooperation in the PR Supply Chain
According to the definition of SC given, where rights and duties play a strategic role,
the main aim of this section is to show how the cooperative institutions operating in the
PR chain have developed paths to defend and increase the SC, such as mutuality, which
also improves the efficiency of the markets for factors and products. This action allows
implementing the behaviors of the agents coherent with the sustainability as an assumption
of responsibility toward shareholders, firms, and the communities in which they operate.
This corresponds to the definition of sustainability used in the paper.
The cooperation played a crucial role in promoting the common rules (disciplinary)
for producing PR and the quality mark, which required a long social process of acceptance
by all the producers of milk, dairy processors, seasoning, and distributors. For instance,
the disciplinary board bans the use of chemical additives for processing milk, and this
constraint affects all the production phases. The very high quality of milk, which is
necessary for seasoning the product for a minimum mandatory of 12 months, requires
precise constrains in the feeding and welfare of animals. The disciplinary board has other
important effects in the organization of the production and in innovation. For example,
the rules for processing milk limit the vertical integration of the plants in the first step of
the process, impeding the industrial organization in many daily cycles, as done by other
competitors such as Grana Padano cheese [16,17]. As we will see later, this makes it very
difficult to achieve economies of scale by increasing the plant size.
Given the limits defined by the disciplinary and shared by the multiplicity of small
firms in the chain, the history of the cooperation into the supply chain outlines a continuous
balancing of the two following constraints: (a) coordination between the different phases
of production to assure regular flows of the product in quantity and with the respect of
quality rules; (b) decision on the distribution of the costs for funding the production, whose
final value depends on the length of seasoning, with a minimum of 12 months and up
to 5 years. The possible decisions influence the choice “make-or-buy” of the enterprises
and, therefore, the degree of integration of the phases and the of division of labor inside
the chain. These problems are enlarged by the great territorial dispersion of small size
milk-producing farms.
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The structural conditions described occur also in many areas of the Italian agri-
food sector, especially in disadvantaged areas [34]. Thus, given the risk arising from the
fluctuations of the prices in the agri-food activity, the market structure is often organized
around hierarchical oligopsonistic relationships, where the market power is exercised by
those who control the final demand. In a market of independent firms, the higher costs
deriving from the risk of price fluctuations are outsourced on those with not have market
power in the supply chain (usually processors, seasoners, distributors, and financial sector).
In this context, a cooperative pact is sustainable if it manages to overcome many
constraints to modify the map of the distribution of the costs and benefits along the chain,
deriving by the current activity and by the expected results. Therefore, the structure of
transactive costs among agents must change, arising relevant questions (social dilemma) for
a private agent, and especially the main question of whether to accept or not the cooperation
pact. For example, what is the convenience of accepting a cooperative agreement that
constitutes an objective limitation on the private business autonomy, instead of giving
milk to a private dairy offering better economic conditions in the short term? Why pool
resources with a limited personal control of them? The size of the transactive costs is
a function of the size of the social dilemma, which requires overcoming the short-term
interests for accepting an uncertain long-term perspective [35].
A single farm has difficulties estimating the current costs of processing milk and the
full process of production. On the contrary, this information is usually known by the
dairy companies, using the same technology and purchasing the milk in the same way,
making a situation of asymmetric information among agents and oligopsonistic power. In
these circumstances, the price set in the market is, in fact, the result of implicit collusion
among the processing companies, with the effect of limiting the search for better market
conditions by the milk producers. In this situation, the development among farmers of
a cooperative pact to promote a dairy phase makes transparent the industrial costs of
processing, seasoning, and so on, benefiting the members of the cooperative and also
all the agents of the chain, for instance through the transparency of the budget or the
other activities of the cooperative. As a consequence, the spread of cooperation reduces
the asymmetric information and increases competition, producing an open system where
the shared information is an important asset of the SC of the entire supply chain. In the
following pages, and especially in the Section 4.3, we will present data showing the effect
of cooperation in the price formation and outlining that the prices paid by the cooperation
are in fact the benchmark for the entire chain.
In the PR chain, there has been a significant presence of cooperation since the 1950s,
especially in dairy and along the full chain, showing the economic effectiveness of the
cooperative firm, which is evident in its long persistence and in its leader role in the
chain. The economic strength of the cooperative is the direct result of the application of the
principles listed above in Table 1, where economy is a relevant aspect. If the seven principles
are fully respected, the cooperative pact is sustainable, and it will produce enterprises
that are able to successfully face the market thanks to the many benefits produced by
cooperation: increasing the productivity of the resources, generating new skill, maintaining,
and enlarging the economic asset of the enterprises to the next generations, promoting
innovation, achieving economies of scale and scope also for SMEs, and so on.
The theoretical objection that has always been raised to cooperatives is that the same
objectives can be achieved more quickly and efficiently by private enterprise. However,
while the attention of the private firm is limited to private interest, the cooperative has
a larger vision, producing larger benefits. For example, the cooperation establishes long-
term commitments with the owners of the resources used, with a reproduction of SC, in
coherence with sustainability according to the definition given before: the constant use and
valorization of the asset (labor, capital, skills), the access to common tools for producing,
and the spill-over of knowledge, all of which derive from the respect of the rights, as in
the case of cooperative dairy of PR, and are common economic resources synergically
reproduced.
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Therefore, it is not surprising that the cooperative enterprise is the predominant form
of enterprise in the supply chain structures in the Parmigiano Reggiano sector. The phase
in which it is most present is the transformation of milk, which is essential to the quality of
the product. However, there are important examples of cooperative enterprise also in the
breeding phase, as well as very sophisticated forms of cooperation between cooperatives
(cooperatives of second degree and consortia) in the downstream phases, where they have
a preponderant economic weight, especially in seasoning and distribution. The current PR
structure is the result of a long evolutionary process, which took place in similar ways in
other sectors and countries [34,36–38].
4. Results of Empirical Research
4.1. The SC of Cooperation and the Structure of the Supply Chain
Table 3 shows the principal information about the variations in the structure, localiza-
tion, and production of the enterprises in the PR district in the 2010–2017 period.



















Plain 2316 1992 −14.0% 280 242 −13.6% 1,278,111 1,481,703 15.9%
Mountain 1207 1051 −12.9% 114 93 −18.4% 356,127 425,553 19.5%
Tot. District 3523 3043 −13.6% 394 335 −15.0% 1,634,238 1,907,256 16.7%
Source: Own presentation.
Production increased by 16.7%, while the number of farms and dairies decreased,
respectively, by −13.6% and −15.0%. Therefore, there has been a general process of
increasing the production capacity of farms and an increase in the size of companies
through acquisitions, mergers, and restructuring.
Apart from the cooperation, the PR chain has the following two main typologies of non-
cooperative enterprise: first, the craft dairy enterprises, usually buying milk on the market,
specialize in processing the milk and then sell the product after at least 12 months. Secondly,
private firms integrate all the production phases, including breeding, processing milk,
seasoning, and marketing. To empirically outline the role and the weight of cooperation in
the chain, we start from Figure 3A, which shows the relevance of the three different types
of firms just described. During the twenty-year period observed in Figure 3A, the structure
of the sector has changed in a not-negligible way: the cooperative firm maintains and
reinforces its prevalent role in the chain in processing milk even if there is an increasing
growth of the other two types of firms.
Figure 3B outlines the production trend of the sample analyzed—divided into cooper-
atives and private—in 2010 and 2017. Most of the enterprises increase their production,
which is on average proportionally to their previous size. This causes a general shift of en-
terprises toward larger average dimensions, leaving unchanged, in general, the distribution
of enterprises.
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Figure 3. Growth of production capacity (A) and struct ral changes of milk processing companies in the PR supply chain
(B). Source: Own presentation.
The g n ral growth of production allowed a diversification f typology of firms and
increas d the division f labor inside the chain, with e s arch for a greater special zation,
for instance differentiating the final product according to the emerging need by consumers
and distribution (portioning, length of seasoning, organic, animal welfare label, s lection of
local traditional animals, etc.). In the general growth shortly described, all the typologies of
enterpris , cooperative and not cooper tive, co-exist in a s lf-regula ed sy tem, with clear
rules and institutions controlli g their respect, making the entir system open and competi-
tive. In the described framework, the socio-economic system stimulated b cooperation
played a crucial role. For example, the institutional action of the cooperative movement
has been very relevant in promoting the coordination among the different agents of the
chain for maintaining in a dynamic equilibrium milk supply, ilk demand for process-
ing, structure for seasoning, funders, and distribution. Moreover, the cooperation plays
a fundamental role in the control of the external shocks thanks to an internal insurance
mechanism for its me bers [39]. Above all, the case study shows that adherence to the
cooperative principles of Table 1 allows increasing the transparency in the distribution
of the value among all agents of the supply chain as well as increasing competition. In
this regard, it is understandable that the US Department of Agriculture in 1922 with the
Capper-Volstead Act—considered the Magna Carta of cooperation in the USA—approved
the role played by competition in the cooperative system, thanks to the principle of the
open door, the democratic control of “one head one vote”, and the self-restraint of profit.
This act has allowed US cooperation to develop extensive supply chain coordination over
time without incurring the rigors of antitrust [40].
4.2. Constraints on the Dimensional Growth of Plants and the Development of Enterprises
As seen before, the rules of PR reduce the possibility of achieving significant economies
of scale through the integration of the process inside the same plant. Given this constraint,
the increase in production has been possible thanks to the implementation of economies
of scale/scope in different phases of the process of production. The search for economies
of integration (scale and scope) needs a steadily increasing of milk flow over time. In a
competitive market, an enterprise can decide the level of production capacity but not the
size and stability in supply of the factors or of the final demand. On the contrary, in a non-
competitive market, the company can achieve a stability of operating conditions through
the exercise of the power of monopsony/monopoly. In our case, stability in the operating
conditions of all the actors is achieved through the institutional coordination: the modern
history of cooperation in the agri-food sector in general, and in the PR chain too, has shaped
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and strengthened all the institutions of coordination of the supply chain—cooperatives
and consortiums, formal and informal—with the aim of maximizing the economies in all
the production phases [35] (p. 15).
The data represented in Figure 4, related to the sample of companies studied, provide
a possible stylization of the effects of the two main constraints—coordination of phases
and territorial dispersion—on production costs and, therefore, in the development path
followed by companies.
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Figure 4. Structure and trend of average processing costs: (A) by type of company; (B) by altimetric area (2009–2017).
Source: Own presentation [17].
In the figure, the companies are divided into two sets: by legal form (panel A) and by
altimetric area (panel B). The distinction is important, because the operating conditions
in the mountain area are more difficult (reduced average size of agricultural enterprises,
territorial dispersion, logistical difficulties, depopulation). The points represent the average
costs of a single enterprise relating to one-year financial statements. The microdata of phys-
ical production refer to a minimum of three observations that allow seeing the evolution of
cost in relation to the degree of capacity utilization.
The theoretical trend of costs is largely predictable according to a k/x model, where
k indicates the fixed costs given the available roduction capacity and x is the variable
quantity of r duct process d. Given the inimum level of fixed costs, observable from the
budget data, we imagi e that this represents a proxy of the co ts of the elementary process:
the minimum sectorial level of k. It is possible to trace the trend of the expected average
costs wh n the production level x on the plant ch ng s (1:1 scale curve). By repeating
the exercise, at different scales with k up to 40 times bigger, the theoretical curves of the
av rage costs can be traced as a function of the quantity produced and in the hypot sis of
a complete absence of economies of scale (constant returns of scale).
Given thes c rves, from a theoretical point f view, if the companies really would
enjoy significant econom es of scale, we expect a fall below the ref rence lines of the average
sts with the growing of the available production capacity and of the volumes of the
processe product. On the contrary, the hypothesis is not confirmed by the trend of the data,
and it cannot be excluded that the mere ttempt to increase the size of the transformation
may also lead to diseconomies f scale. However, the comparison between the two graphs
provides further useful information:
• With the qual volumes transformed, the coopera ive dairies hav lower aver ge costs.
Exceptions are some private old microstructures—par cularly in mountain area—
where the absence of new investme s mak s the costs of amortization negligible.
• The processing facilities in mountain areas are all carried out in smaller-scale plants
due to the difficulty of collecting a flow of milk without increasing transport costs. The
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role of cooperative enterprises is predominant, although many plants—the smallest—
are private artisan dairies.
• A not negligible number of dairies have a very low degree of capacity utilization
(high average costs). This is an indicator of structural difficulties in the supply and
coordination of milk flows influenced by the change in the structure of breeders:
i.e., the abandonment of breeders, or the transfer of their activity or the production
quotas to another area. Another difficulty may be the disagreement on the economic
decision of the dairy (conditions of sale, funding, etc.). In general, given that the milk
market is competitive and that there is the principle of the open door, modifications
in the agreements among companies may engender structural changes, inbound and
outbound, with significant repercussions on the degree of utilization of the production
capacity of dairies and, therefore, on the level of the average costs.
All the individual cooperatives, and still the cooperative movement, through their
representatives and in the daily relations with the firms, have faced these phenomena
when implementing processes of coordination of the supply chain. The path followed—
also marked by serious failures—started half century ago from a systematic attempt to
rationalize the dairy network through agreements, mergers, and incorporations. However,
as seen in the last graph, there are limits in achieving economies of scale. Despite these
difficulties, the cooperation has always sought to increase the integration of the different
phases, seeking not only economies of scale through the promotion of a continuous process
of innovation compatibly with the disciplinary but also searching for economies of scope,
implementing the coordination of the different agents of the supply chain. Figure 4 outlines
the positive results reached by the cooperation thanks to this action of coordination.
4.3. The SC of Cooperation: Economic Performance of the Cooperative Enterprises versus
Other Forms
The process of implementation of SC in PR, as it appears today, started at the end
of the 1970s with the decision by the cooperative central management and by the local
public institutions to seek economies of scale by integrating the existing dairies, with the
aim of gaining competitivity and limiting the negative effects of the PR prices fluctuations.
Both the region and the provinces supported the not-easy process, which is finalized to
overpass the limits arising by the large presence of SMEs in the chain, especially in the
disadvantaged areas, where old and small farmers, often without successors, were most of
the social composition of the cooperative processing milk.
The aim to increase the physical size of the plants did not face difficulties, while the
acceptance of the aim by the social base of the cooperatives did not represent an easy task
to reach. Indeed, the effort to broaden the social base of the new cooperatives through
mergers changed the identity of the previous team, which was strongly linked to the specific
history of the group of founding members. The action of the coordinating institutions
encouraged all the principles of the cooperation, especially emphasizing the “open door”
and “democracy” through a bottom–up participatory decision-making process.
However, the economic benefits of the increased scale of production were limited and
pushed to the search of other economies: gradually incorporating services of production;
seeking neighborhood economies in the seasoning phase; implementing a process of
institutional and economic innovation connecting the cooperative to new corporate brands
(consortia of second and third degree). Each step involved innovation in agreements among
cooperatives with a continuous and not easy balance of the different interests, which was a
process supported by SC deriving by the previous experience of cooperation and producing
new collective material and immaterial goods, enlarging the SC. For instance, the difficult
decision to distribute the patronage refunds according to the quality of milk enlarged both
productivity and new skill; in turn, the new attention of the agents toward quality required
at the beginning a capacity of negotiation among members to accept the innovation, the
related decision of investment, the system of control, and the new form of payment. All
the aspects engendered material and immaterial benefits that enlarged cooperation SC.
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Moreover, the successful innovation was fast imitated along the chain, expanding the
common goods that benefit all the actors of the system.
The graph in Figure 5 shows the values of indicators elaborated by the financial
statements of all the PR companies, comparing the performance of cooperatives versus
other forms of enterprises.



































Figure 5. Economic indicators for the form of enterprise (standardized median values). Source: Own
presentation.
In order to be compared, the indicators were standardized (Z-variables). For all
the indicators of economic structure and performance, the results outline the absence on
average of statistically significant differences between cooperatives and other companies.
According to the standard economy, this may be the result of the market competition.
However, the competition is not the state of nature, and the equilibrium is not a necessary
mechanical consequence of the competition. In this regard, cooperation plays a crucial
role to realize competition and avoid the monopsony power of processing or distribution,
pushing in the direction shown by the graph. The role of cooperation in this regard is
outlined by the indicators of the profitability, where there are differences between business
models: the private enterprises appear more profitable (e.g., %EBITDA/Turnover), even if
the indicators of the technical /structural aspects (Fixed Costs) are almost homogeneous
among all h typologies of enterprises. It must be u derlined that th value-added is
calculated in a different way: in the cooper tives, the remuneration of milk incorporates
not only th cost of producti n of milk but also the Patronage Refund, as a premium of
mutu lity, in term of self-financing, risk p oling, nhancement of the resources of the
members, and savings on transactive costs. Moreover, for the cooperative, the indebtedness
(Debit Equity Ratio) is higher, because it includes the debts of the members without
calculating their assets. Consequently, the different level of cooperative indebtedness is
done as a constraint for the cooperative budget structure imposed by the Fiscal Authority
and does not refer to a weakness of the cooperative enterprise. At the opposite, the higher
profits of the companies derive by the minimization of business risk financed by a lower
remuneration for milk (and labor) on the free market.
In other words, the different performance of the two types of enterprise suggests
the active role of cooperation in the distribution of the income among all agents (farmers,
dairies, labor, seasoning, marketing, etc.) and in the regulation of the prices of the factors,
stabilizing the entire chain.
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Figure 6 shows the Value Added and Turnover ratio trend (2009–2018) by the legal
form and size of the company, which adds some interesting specifications, showing the
ten-year trend of the ratio between VA/Turnover in the different types of firms and by size.
For the years considered, the graph shows the differences in the median values (black line
inside the bars) and in the variability of the index (width of the bars). Three relevant facts
are visible:
• Over the entire period, for cooperatives and independently by their dimension, the
index is substantially stable in its level and variability (size bars).
• Large private dairies behave no differently from cooperatives.
• In private dairies of smaller size, there is a progressive reduction of the indicator
and a convergence with the values of other companies (especially in peripheral
mountain areas).
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Figure 6. Value Added and Turnover ratio trend (2009–2018) by legal form and size of the company. Source: Own
presentation.
In the period considered, the PR sector has always grown and has never suffered
downward shocks in prices. Then—for the firms using the same technology and with the
same labor costs—the value of the index may be considered a proxy of profitability for the
ownership rights of the company versus the prices paid to the milk producers. However,
we have seen that the role and economic weight of cooperation affects the income distri-
bution of factors and, in turn, the general operating conditions of the entire sector. These
conditions are also reflected in the prices/costs structure of the largest private companies
that are in continuous competitive comparison with the cooperative sector, both on the raw
material market and on the intermediate and final arkets. Therefore, dynamically—even
if th re are differences betw en cooperatives and other forms of enterprises, especi lly in
the smaller size classes—the whole price/income system tends to conv rge, i terms of
levels and degre of variability (proportional to the width of the bars), on the values of
cooperative mpanies.
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5. Conclusions
The main purpose of this work was to show the nature of the SC (set of non-private
assets) and its role in determining the greater sustainability of the system in which it
is created and maintained. For this reason, the measure of the productivity of SC is its
contribution to increasing the sustainability of the ecological–social system that uses it.
SC is not a resource existing in nature but is the result of collective choices characterized
by precise assumptions of responsibility and commitments. Having therefore defined the
general theoretical framework, an attempt was made to observe how and why agents
undertake coherent collective choices, which establish pacts and form institutions capable
of regulating coherent behavior in balancing short-term individual interests and long-term
collective interests.
The cooperative enterprise and the rules universally adopted by the cooperative
movement constituted the second focus of the work. In particular, the article attempts to
show the strong interaction between SC and cooperation in the specific case study provided
by the PR chain. It was discussed how the synergies between the action of individual
companies and the system are strongly linked to social action that has found solutions to
the many emerging problems, balancing different interests, and in compliance with the
principles of cooperation. Valentinov’s consideration [7], that a high SC available in the
social environment of a cooperative produces a greater SC, is verified by the results of the
paper, also confirming Elinor Ostrom’s aphorism: “Social capital is not consumed with
use but rather with disuse” [21] (p. 179). The PR case study is proof of the possibility
of following a path of successful development over time if there are positive synergies
between CSR, supply chain relationships, local institutions, and regional policies.
In the case study, there is never evidence of significant effects of the so-called “dark
side” of the SC, which is attributable to the cooperative action. On the contrary, the
cooperative system is shown to be open to competition and a positive benchmark also for
other agents not linked to cooperation. In fact, the other operators cannot easily disregard
the rules of product quality and the safeguarding of the factors used: manpower, raw
materials, the environment. The paper illustrates data and examples of operation of the
supply chain in which SC is continuously reproduced. The relationships between agents
and the role played by cooperation generate trust, inclusive institutions, non-opportunistic
behaviors, fair distribution of income between agents, social and technical innovation.
According to the thesis supported in this work, those goods are precisely the testimony
of a sustainable eco-social processes, which is made possible by the respect of the set of
conditions that regulate the formation and reproduction of all collective goods.
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